Dinner with Raphael
The prolegomena of Peter Martyr Vermigli’s Eucharistic Intellections

by Gary Jenkins

“When it is said that Raphael did not eat, it must not be understood as though he did not eat at all, but that he did not eat in a human manner [...] when the angel answered that he uses spiritual meat and drink, that spiritual food was nothing else than an open and manifest knowledge of the true God [...] The same also is our meat, though not exactly the same. For angels see God manifestly, we through a mirror, and in a riddle [...] those who believe in Christ [...] I say that they both eat the flesh of Christ and drink his blood, to which use the symbols or signs, since they stir up the senses, are very profitable. Not that the flesh and blood of Christ are poured into the bread and wine, or are by any means included in those elements, but because those things are by the believers received with a true faith. For these are invisible nourishment, and received only in the mind.”

This essay began as a footnote to a larger study, one looking at Peter Martyr Vermigli’s epistemology as it relates to both his Eucharistic theology and his belief that faith is an act of the intellect, and how both are understood within the constraints of his Aristotelianism. In treating this other matters invari-

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1 Peter Martyr Vermigli, In librum Iudicum commentarii, Zurich: Christoph Froschauer, 1561, 152v: «Quare cum in altero textu dicitur, Raphaelem non comedisse, non ita est intelligendum, quasi prorsus non comederit, sed quod human more non comederit. Illud aut imprimis animadvertendum ibi est, cum angelus respondet, se invisibili cibo ac potu vesci, eam alimoniam spiritualem nihil aliud fuisset, quam apertam et perspicuam notitiam veri dei [...] Idem etiam noster cibus est, quamvis non eiusdem modi; illi enim aperte deum vident; nos autem per speculum, et in aeignmate. Quibus addas etiam eos qui credunt Christo, et certo sibi persuadent, eum sua causa esse mortuum, et comedere carnem Christi, et eius bibere sanguinem, ad quem usum symbola dum sensum excitant, plurimum conferunt; non quod caro Christi et sanguis in panem et vinum infundantur, aut elementis illis aliquo modo concludantur, sed quod res illae vera fide a credentibus percipliantur. Sunt enim invisibilis alimonia, quae mente solum capitur.» – Martyr then adds, «ut Augustinus fideliter monuit: Quid, inquiens, paras dentem et ventrem? Crede et manducasti.» Emphasis in the translated text added, and these two terms shall be touched on again in the conclusion.

2 Beyond an examination of how faith is an intellectual act, the intended essay examines how Martyr’s epistemology could circumvent the problems comprehended in Aristotle’s agent intellect, and what these problems might entail for Martyr’s Eucharistic doctrine: namely that what the soul intellects is formally the same as the pragmata of intellection. If Martyr extricates himself from the formal link, how can he then avoid not merely a Nestorian sacramentology, but more especially a Docetic Eucharistic faith, the tacit and otherwise contention of his protagonists. The most pressing matters, however, entail Martyr’s use of causality and its link to epistemology (and how these are affected by the scholastic reconfiguration of the intellect), how he employs Aristotle’s teaching that forms exist in concrete realities, and how
ably intruded that generated this paper in regard to Martyr’s use of Christology in the definition of his Eucharistic thought, viz., the dissonant use (as will be argued) of an enigmatic theologian, the fifth-century father, Blessed Theodoret of Cyrus. Not to slight any angels by looking at «the blessed», Raphael will return in the essay’s conclusion; the Stagerite, however, will have to wait.

Peter Martyr Vermigli, formally and materially, at least by Roman Catholic lights, was a heretic. The reasons annexed for this judgment only indirectly touch the matter of this essay. The chief concern here, rather, is Martyr’s appropriation of certain avenues of argument and his use of theological analogies and syllogisms as they appear in Theodoret of Cyr (393–457/66). The opacity of Theodoret of Cyr’s thought arose from the debates that concern the Council of Chalcedon (AD 451), both the runup and the sequel, and how the council interpreted the theology of St. Cyril of Alexandria. Theodoret himself had written in the 430s and 440s against Cyril’s theology, and expressly against his twelve Anathemas of Nestorius, and had been a defender of the several theologians who duelled with Cyril, including Theodore of Mopsuestia. Theodoret faced censure and deposition, but was eventually reinstated following a rather flattering letter to pope Leo I. Different historians and theologians have lined up defending or indicting Theodoret: both observant Catholics and Orthodox, as well as the odd Anglo-catholic have defended him, and those of the same confessions have slighted his orthodoxy. The most recent sortie into this field is Paul B. Clayton’s «The Christology of Theodoret of Cyrus». Assessing Theodoret’s theology faces several obstacles. One material cause of this ambiguity, is the decree of the fifth ecumenical council, the second of Constantinople, in 553. Animated by the political hopes of the theologically astute emperor, Justinian I, the Council condemned Theodoret’s expressly anti-Cyrillian writings. The council was not discriminating of Theodoret’s works in what it placed in the condemned «Three Chapters»; it simply stated that those which spoke against Cyril were indicted. Though Leo I the Great had rehabilitated Theodoret (condemned both of these are handled by Martyr in his making faith an intellectual act. To answer properly the questions involved entails treating how exactly Martyr, in whatever way an Aristotelian, employed and applied the teachings of the Philosopher to his theology.


The three chapters were the entire corpus of Theodore of Mopsuestia, the anti-Cyrillian writings of Ibas of Edessa, and the offending works of Theodoret «in which [he] had attacked the anathematisms of Cyril of Alexandria and the Council of Ephesus (431), and in which he specifically rejected any form of theopaschism.» The first condemnation came from Justinian in 544. Cf. Jean Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, Crestwood 1975, 80–81. For a full discussion of Justinian, his thought along with supporting documents, and the controversy over the Three Chapters, see On the Person of Christ: The Christology of Emperor Justinian, trans. Kenneth P Wesche, Crestwood 1991.
in the Latrocinium council of Ephesus in 449), and though then admitted to sit at the Council of Chalcedon, having subscribed to the Twelve Chapters and condemned Nestorius, as Patrick Gray has noted, Theodoret never transcended the suspicions of the Cyrillians of the council (one mention of him in the Acta identified him as a «disguised Nestorian»). He lived till 457 or 466, continuing his writing, and died in the communion of the Church. Thus, there was no question in 553 of condemning him per se. But the condemnation met resistance, both from Rome and in the East, as a number of Chalcedonians had used Theodoret, especially in the latter half of the fifth century, against the Monophysites. Indeed Rome did not want to accept the condemnation, for it had been Leo I the Great who had exonerated Theodoret, but Pope Vigilius eventually agreed to the action.

Those writings of Theodoret that were overtly opposed to the Alexandrian theology comprised only a portion of his corpus. Thus the question is, should all of the remainder then be viewed as ample food for the soul of the faithful? Here more problems emerge: while some strict Orthodox refer to Theodoret as «blessed Theodoret», as Fr. Jean Meyendorff, Patrick Gray, and Paul Clayton have pointed out, Theodoret accepted, but only with a Nestorian gloss, the faith professed at Chalcedon, Cyril of Alexandria’s assertions about the One Christ as expressed in the Formula of Union of 433, Leo’s Tome and the Council’s decree. His reputation’s revival rested on many seeing Chalcedon as a corrective to Cyril, exemplified in modern scholars seeing a Neo-Chalcedonian party. This interpretation, identified with such historians of doctrine as J. N. D. Kelly and Jaroslav Pelikan (at least in his earlier works), inter alios, is now questioned. One place the revisionists point to is Theodoret’s comments on the words of St. Luke at the end of the second chapter of his Gospel, that Christ grew in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and man: Theodoret applied these only to Christ’s human nature, not to the Word, and while he nowhere ever identifies the prosopon of Christ with the prosopon of the Word, he does take pains to distinguish them. His letter to John of Aegae, written subsequent to Chalcedon, gives the measure of Theodoret’s ambivalence toward the Council. The Chalcedonian formula,

6 Ibid. This rehabilitation was based upon, as Gray puts it, the evidence of one very flattering letter to the Pontiff and the emperor. Gray goes on to show that Theodoret’s place in the council was minimal, due to his fellow bishops open hostility to him.
7 Most notably his «Apology for Diodorus and Theodore», and his condemnation of Cyril’s 12 Anathemas and defense of Nestorius. Much of Theodoret’s work is lost, but his extant works fill four volumes of Migne, plus several other pieces collected since. A good bit of this is commentary on the Scriptures.
8 See, for example, the discussion of Theodoret’s work in Georges Florovsky, The Byzantine Fathers Of the Sixth to Eighth Century, Vol. IX of Collected Works (Belmont, 1987).
according to the letter, could only make for two readings: that the one hypo-
stasis was that of a composite *physis* (a deformed Monophysitism, or more aptly, Eutycheanism), or else that it was a prosopon of union, i.e., Nestorianism.\(^9\) Chalcedon assumed a minor footnote to his theology, or at best as some corrective or revision of Cyril. While having condemned his old friend, Nestorius, at Chalcedon, he never would admit to the theology that saw the one prosopon of the Incarnate Christ as identical with the hypostasis of the Divine Logos. As Clayton puts it, «after his participation in Chalcedon, his only way to justify the expression one *hypostasis* in two *physeis* is to make it mean a union in *prosopon* – that is, *kata prosopon.*»\(^10\) Because defenders of Chalcedon employed Theodoret, he became a stone of stumbling for the Monophysites. For many, both after the Council of Chalcedon and even today, Theodoret’s most famous theological treatise, the «Eranistes», is read simply as an anti-Monophysite tract (though written against Eutyches, whom the Monophysites also condemned), failing to see its essential Nestorian and anti-Cyrillian character.\(^11\) The implications of this for Peter Martyr must now be examined.

Martyr linked analogically his Eucharistic theology and his Christology proper. To this end, he employed Theodoret in two distinct settings, though both of them in regard to his Eucharistic polemic. First Theodoret served as a foil of Roman Catholics with regard to transubstantiation during the Oxford Disputation of 1549, and then similarly in the subsequent «Tractatio» on the Eucharist. He used this anti-transubstantiation tactic as well with his «Defensio» of Cranmer against Gardiner. His other use of Theodoret pertained to his arguments with the Lutherans, and Johannes Brenz in particular, in the «Dialogus de utraque in Christo natura».\(^12\) Martyr put Theodoret into service to assail the Lutheran doctrine of the omnipresent nature of Christ’s divinized human nature, and thus, consequently, a presence in, with, and under the Eucharistic elements, a doctrine dubbed ubiquitarianism.

With respect to the Catholics the polemical use of Theodoret is readily apparent: here, a notable Church Father, one who though at one time a heretic, namely a Nestorian, but who had been as well rehabilitated by no one less

\(^9\) Clayton, Theodoret, 275–277.
\(^10\) Ibid, 51.
\(^11\) Clayton spends considerable effort in detailing the «Eranistes’» Nestorian nature. This view is also maintained by Francis Sullivan, The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Rome 1956; and Edward Kilmartin, The Eucharist in the West: History and Theology, ed., Robert J. Daly, Collegeville, MN 1998; and Patrick Gray.
than Pope St. Leo the Great, had set out in his three-part dialogue, «Eran-
istes» 13, a definition of the Eucharist hardly commensurate with the Catholic
doctrine of transubstantiation. Written about 448 prior to his rehabilitation,
Theodoret, addressing the main questions of Christology, makes several
analogies, drawn on Eucharistic considerations, about the nature of the
union of the two natures in Christ. Martyr adopts Theodoret’s Eucharistic
analogies, wherein the fifth-century father – at times defending Theodore of
Mopsuestia against Cyril of Alexandria, and at other times aiming at Eu-
tyches – asserts a Eucharistic theology opposing the Eutychian and putative
Monophysite notion that the Eucharistic elements undergo a substantial
change analogous to the change of Christ’s flesh at the ascension. 14 Martyr’s
anti-Catholic polemic rests on Theodoret’s legacy as a Nestorian prodigal re-
turned home. He notes at the 1549 Oxford disputation that Theodoret was
«held to be most learned and eloquent [...] a learned man and saintly member
of Christ’s church.» 15 Martyr, further, casts him as a defender of the faith
against the Eutycheans (and implicitly the Lutherans): «He stands against
those who denied that Christ had a true body, saying that at the time of the
ascension his body was completely changed into the divine nature.» In the
«Defensio contra Gardineram» Martyr uses Theodoret’s Eucharistic anal-
ogy, that as the bread remains within the Eucharist unconverted, so too does
Christ remain in his human nature, unconverted, in heaven. For Martyr, of
course, the analogy is simply reversed. 16

This all is fairly stable ground with respect to formal Christological
matters, but Martyr’s use of Theodoret in the «Dialogus» presents a number
doing difficulties. The «Dialogus», formally a Christological dialogue, materi-
ally and in intent is a treatise on the Eucharist. Since the early 1520s, and
given fulsome amplification at Marburg in 1529, Luther and his colleagues
had argued that the humanity of Christ was animated and defined, since the
resurrection and ascension, by the infinite power of God entailed in the no-
tion of «God’s right hand». 17 Thus the humanity of Christ was present

13 Jacques Paul Migne, Patrologia cursus completus, Series Graecae [MPG], vol 83.
14 Kilmartin, Eucharist in the West, 37–41.
16 Defensio doctrinae veteris et Apostolici de sacrosancto eucharistiae sacramento adversus
Stephanam Gardinerem, Zurich: Christoph Froschauer, 1559. Martyr’s use of Theodoret’s
theology of Peter Martyr, 1500–1562, Edinburgh 1957, 104–110.
17 Luther’s doctrine of the real presence slighted transubstantiation, and he had come to this
conclusion before his debates about the issue with Karlstadt in 1523, and certainly well before
the disputes with Zwingli and Oecolampadius beginning in 1526. He had garnered his doc-
trine at least some ten years prior to the famous confrontation at the Marburg Colloquy from
Pierre d’Ailly, who had maintained the real presence without holding to transubstantiation.
throughout all creation, not «chained» to the right hand of God as if in some location. To the Lutherans, this was a natural consequence of the doctrine of the hypostatic union and the communicatio idiomatum. Pantachus, Martyr’s appellation for Brenz in the «Dialogus», asserts, and here citing Pope Gelasius (d. 496), that «the whole man continues to be what God is, as the whole God continues to be whatever a man is.»¹⁸ For Brenz, the hypostatic union renders the human nature of Christ coextensive or coterminus with the divine nature, and in this way presents us with a new reading of not only Gelasius, but also Cyril of Alexandria. Martyr correctly saw this Lutheran idiom as an overstatement of the case. His retort, aside from tacitly accusing Brenz of Monophysitism, focused on the distinction of natures made emphatically dogmatic by the 433 formula of union, and explicit by Chalcedon. Martyr minces no words that he holds without reservation «the three creeds, namely the Apostles’, Nicene, and Athanasian creeds, as well as the first six Councils, in what they defined regarding the most blessed Trinity, the person of the Son of God and his two natures [...]»¹⁹ Martyr had already declared that, «Christ is one person, but he has two natures conjoined in the same hypostasis but both retain their properties intact and whole.»²⁰ Within this confession, Martyr’s Christology is nothing other than Orthodox and Catholic, inviolate in form and creed (leaving aside the question of the Athanasian formula). But this statement says more than what Martyr wished. His employment of Theodoret, inter alia, puts Martyr opposite the last two councils which he here declares he embraces.

Martyr’s reading of Theodoret betrays an equivocation in his use of terms: namely, Word, Son, nature, and Christ – equivocations made all the more problematic given, as herein argued, Theodoret’s veiled Nestorianism. First, Martyr pressed the identity of the Word with the divine nature almost to an equation of the two. Care must be taken, but it is evident that he tries to stretch what the Word’s divinity entails beyond what Cyril did. Martyr maintains that «the divine nature of the Word is incapable of death and really can’t be said to have died.» He then cites Theodoret from part III of the «Er-anistes», [Impatibilis]:

Luther admits as early as 1520 in his «The Babylonian Captivity of the Church» to having read d’Ailly, whose teaching on this was expressed in his «Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum». The central place of ubiquitarianism in Luther’s teaching is set out in Hermann Sasse, This is My Body, This is My Body: Luther’s contention for the Real Presence in the Sacrament of the Altar, Minneapolis 1959. Davis questions Sasse’s contention about ubiquity’s centrality, asserting that ubiquity for Luther was little more than a guarantor of the Word effecting God’s promises. See Thomas Davis, This is My Body: The Presence of Christ in Reformation Thought, Grand Rapids 2008, 41–63.

¹⁸ Vermigli, Dialogue on the Two Natures in Christ, 28.
¹⁹ Vermigli, Dialogue on the Two Natures in Christ, 23.
²⁰ Ibid.
«But those who hear of the passion of God’s Son don’t do even this [distinguishing between body and soul]; rather they give no thought to the body, to which the suffering pertains; and then the passion would prove, by the language it uses, that the divine nature, which is impassible and immutable and immortal, is mortal and able to suffer. And when they know this, the assumption of the body would have been superfluous, if the nature of God the Word could suffer.» 21

Martyr cites Theodoret further: «If he, who before the incarnation could not suffer, after the incarnation suffered, he suffered by undergoing a change. And if he, who before becoming a man was immortal, tasted death after becoming a man [...] he was radically changed, from immortal to mortal.» In introducing this section, Martyr noted that «the divine nature of God the Word is incapable of death and really can’t be said to have died.» 22 Martyr’s imprecision, here and elsewhere, can be attributed to what he believed Brenz was teaching, that the Lutheran use of the *communicatio idiomatum* was nothing other than a confusion of the two natures in Christ. But his argument here goes beyond this: the identification of the Word with the divine nature precludes the Word from assuming the foibles of human nature. Martyr, by rightly noting the impassibility of the divine nature, then identifies this as a limiting term to the hypostasis of the Word.

What this does is then leave Martyr open to the charge of Nestorianism, not merely by the confusion, but what this then would lead him to assert about the Word’s relation to the humanity. The really damning, or as might be said, anathematizing, quote, or better put, commentary on a quote, comes next:

«In his third dialogue [Theodoret] adds, ‘Saint Peter in his catholic epistle says that Christ suffered in the flesh. But he who hears Christ understands not the incorporeal God the Word, but the incarnate Word. The name of Christ signifies both natures. That the Word was subjected to suffering in the flesh signifies that one nature, not both, suffered. He who hears that Christ suffered in the flesh again recognizes him as the impassible God, but attributes the suffering to the flesh alone.’ » 23

This assertion obliterates the union that the Word has with human nature, for at best it makes it little more than a fiction, and effectively creates, as had Nestorius, two Words. A few folios on, Martyr cites Theodoret’s citation of Eustathius, and observes that, «These words also show which properties are so much a part of human nature that they cannot be communicated to the

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21 Ibid, 63.
22 Ibid, 62.
23 Ibid, 63–64. Donnelly’s translation has an opening quote at the beginning of the quotation from Theodoret, but no closing quote. He also attributes the quotation to 1 Peter 3,18 (which reads «He was put to death for us in the flesh»), but it is 1 Peter 4,1. The citation of Theodoret is from MPG 83, 263A.
Word.» 24 One must ask, is anything created communicable then to the Word? Can anything be assumed? What might Gregory of Nazianzenus think of this theology?

Martyr then quotes Cyril of Alexandria from his letter to John of Antioch:

«Besides, we all confess that the Word of God is impassible even though in distributing wisely this mystery the Word seems to have attributed to itself the suffering that happened uniquely to the flesh. That wise man Peter says as much, ‘Christ suffered in the flesh’ for us; he did not say, ‘in the nature of his ineffable divinity’. [...] From this passage it is already taken for granted that the sufferings of Christ belong to his flesh, but it speaks about the Word insofar as the Word attributes them to itself. And so they belong to the Word in the judgment and statement of Scripture, not because the Word Itself really suffered and died.» 25

The telling point is that Martyr gives this passage a sense that stands Cyril on his head. 26 Cyril now professes that the Word should not be attributed with the sufferings of the human nature, but only that He «seems» to suffer. From this Martyr then commits a grave error, when he fails to read the distinction that Cyril so clearly maintained, that the Word truly suffered, but not in His divine, but in his human nature. Martyr, commensurate with what was already cited, makes the communicatio idiomatum a seeming fiction, appropriated by Christ only in appearance. He then proceeds to muddle that about which Cyril was so explicit:

«When Cyril said that the Word suffered in the flesh, he gave offence to many people. To absolve himself he wrote in his twelfth Anathema «But because we say that it was exclusively his own body that he received from the holy Virgin, we are on very solid ground in saying that the sufferings of the flesh belonged to him according to the distribution of properties, taking into consideration everywhere his impassible nature. For God comes from God. Therefore when he is said to suffer in the flesh, he is not to be understood as suffering in his own proper nature, for his body that is united to him was created, as I said earlier», and so forth. Therefore he himself asserts that the Word did not suffer in its own nature.»

It can be argued that Martyr here teaches that the Word does not suffer in the divine nature, and with this Cyril would certainly agree. But this is not what Martyr is saying, and indeed he has confused Cyril’s use of Word and nature,

24 Ibid, p. 66. The letter is often referred to by its Latin title «Laetentur coeli». Emphasis added.
26 Martyr translated ὅπωτο (the middle and passive present optative forms of ὅπωτο) as seems instead of is seen. I am working off the text in MPG 77,180. In Martyr’s original text (Dialogus, 39v), he translated ὅπωτο, as videatur. It could be translated into English as is seen, yet this would then go against Martyr’s argument, and I agree fully with Donnelly’s translation of seems. My thanks to John Patrick Donnelly for his aid on this text.
making them univocal terms. He then goes on to quote again from Theodoret, and here Martyr’s argument falls short of ecumenical Christology:

«Whatever divine names the Scripture leaves free from suffering, you too should allow to be free without attributing his suffering to them. God never joined suffering to this terminology», and so forth. He [Martyr writing of Theodoret] adds, «He does not permit this expression, ‘the Word suffered in the flesh’. He says, ‘This speaks about the manner of his suffering, not his inability to suffer’. Nobody has said this about the human soul. Would anybody say, unless completely senseless, that the soul of Paul died in the flesh? This would not even be said about the most depraved and criminal of men. Even the wicked have immortal souls. But we say, for example, that the murderer is killed, but no one would say that his soul was killed in the flesh», and so forth.» 27

Martyr then adds, «But this author admits that Christ suffered in the flesh, as did Peter, but he by no means allows the expression that the Word suffered in the flesh.» Here Martyr has fallen short of Cyril, Ephesus, and indeed Leo and Chalcedon: he has distinguished, as had Nestorius, Christ from the Word. In order more emphatically to reinforce the case concerning the distinctions of the human nature from the Person of the Word, Martyr adduces Gregory of Nazianzenus from his oft cited letter to Cledonius. He calls on Gregory to assert that the union of the Word with human nature is only verbal, and that we should be careful always to preserve the Word’s impassibility.

«If anybody says that the Lord’s flesh came down from heaven and does not have its origin with us here [NB Martyr omits ‘nor of us though above us’], let him be anathema. For ‘the second man is from heaven’, and ‘as is the man from heaven, so are those who are of heaven’. And, ‘no one has ascended into heaven but he who descended from heaven, the Son of Man [NB: Martyr omits ‘which is in heaven’]. […]’ 28 [and in] other similar passages [as those just quoted], we must understand that those expressions are the result of the union with man, for instance, that ‘all things were made’ through Christ and ‘that Christ may dwell in our hearts’. It is not as God that he appears but as he is understood, with the terms applied as are also the natures.»

But Martyr omits the last clause from the last sentence: «flowing into one another according to the law of their intimate union.» 29 Earlier in the letter, Gregory had already written

«God and man are two natures, as also soul and body are, but not two sons or two gods. For neither in this life are there two manhoods, even though Paul speaks using such language as of the inner and outer man. And, if I may speak directly, the

27 Ibid, p. 67
28 Ibid, p. 68. The citation from Gregory is in MPG 37,181. The letter runs cols 175A-193B.
29 καὶ περι/

 MPG 37,181C.
Savior is composed of that which is distinct from each other, for the invisible is not the same as the visible, nor the eternal with what is time-bound, yet he is not divided. Let this never be said! For both natures are one by the union, the deity made man (ἐνανθρωπήσαντος), and the human deified (θεωθέντος).» 30

Martyr, Aristotelian though he was, had fallen into an undesirable syllogism. Francis A. Sullivan S. J., in his «Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia» finds the theological distinctions between Antioch (prior to John of Antioch’s reconciliation with Cyril in 433) and Alexandria arising from how Theodore on the one hand and Athanasius on the other responded to the essential Arian Syllogism: The word is the subject even of the human operations and sufferings of Christ (major premise); but whatever is predicated of the Word, must be predicated of him κατά φύσιν (minor premise); ergo, the nature of the Word is limited and affected by the human operations and sufferings of Christ. 31 The Antiochians denied the major premise, the Alexandrians the minor. 32 This is evident in Peter Martyr, but for him the reaction is not one predicated upon defending the Word’s divinity, but instead arises from having found ammunition to defend his doctrines both of the Eucharist and of justification, ready-made in Theodoret, the blessed.

This brings us back to Raphael. Though Peter Martyr did not form his Eucharistic theology solely within the context of his polemic, which seems more to have been the character of Luther’s efforts, he nonetheless did construct it in conjunction with his soteriology. While there is a material union of God and man in the Incarnation, this does not effect an individual’s salvation; it gives no hope to the damned. Obtaining the benefits of Christ demanded more than what the immediate reality of the Incarnation proffered. For Martyr, the benefits of union with Christ are not mediated to the Christian through bread and wine, but mediated to the soul by faith, the bread and the wine being instruments by which the Incarnation’s benefits come to the Christian. This is what true eating and drinking were, just as they were for Raphael. Thus, the flesh of Christ, verbally (and seemingly not really and fully) the flesh of the Word, nonetheless profits nothing in regard to union with God, except by way of analogy: in the bread Christians see the body of Christ, but they must look beyond this with faith, and look beyond the material to the eternal. Martyr’s making the suffering of Christ only in the flesh

30 Ibid, 180A.
31 Sullivan, Christology of Theodore, 162. Sullivan elaborates on this insight for some pages, but draws the Alexandrian recognition of it, and its response to it, from St. Athanasius’ «Against the Arians», the second book, pp. 162–65. Paul Clayton picks up on this insight as well: Christology of Theodoret, 283, et cetera.
32 The rejection of the minor premise for Athanasius et al., rests on the fact that it saw but one nature in Christ. While things predicated are predicated according to nature, Christ has two natures, temporal and eternal.
abstracted from the Word, rings consonant with aspects of his soteriology: while faith could use material instruments, which the Eucharist was, what the sacraments promised was only realized in the world to come. Salvatore Corda has pointed out that the benefits the Romanists attached to the Eucharist (physical union with Christ) Martyr reserved for the world to come. In this world the Christian had no salvific union with Christ apart from that effected by faith, one which made us move beyond the visual, beyond mirrors and enigmas, to the union of Christ with the believer in the mind, that is *en mentem*. Faith, an intellection, was the vehicle to obtain Christ, and not the flesh, which profits nothing, at least as far as this life is concerned.

Martyr’s acceptance of the first six councils did not impede his Eucharistic appropriation of Theodoret. Many Monophysites had balked at accepting Chalcedon because it had not condemned Theodore of Mopsuestia. This oversight, it may be said, was rectified by the fifth council, which not only posthumously condemned Theodore, but which also maintained that One of the Holy Trinity suffered, adopting the term, which Martyr took such pains to deny, Theopaschism. This is not to valorize the Lutheran doctrine, but that Martyr in an attempt to answer the error he perceived in the Lutherans, had, and seemingly athwart his own admissions, fallen into another.

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